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The last decade has seen 
extraordinary changes in U.S. welfare 
programs. Even as early as 1970, with 
greater numbers of mothers in paid 
employment, public opinion had begun 
to shift toward an increased emphasis on 
work as an alternative to welfare. The 
shift to an employment-focused system 
gained momentum in the 1990s, initially 
with states modifying Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
under federal waivers, and culminating 
in passage of the federal Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act in 1996. This 
bipartisan legislation, which replaced 
AFDC with Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF), established 
explicit program participation and work 
requirements for participants, limited the 
length of time recipients could receive 
aid, and further expanded state autonomy.
Reform-oriented policy changes 
during the 1990s were accompanied by 
major declines in the national caseload. 
After peaking at 5.0 million in 1994, 
caseloads began a decline, falling to 
3.9 million in 1997, the year TANF was 
implemented in most states, and 2.6 
million in 1999, a level not seen since 
1970. While increasing numbers of 
families are transitioning from welfare 
to work, whether welfare leavers will 
succeed in achieving stable employment 
and economic self-suffi ciency over the 
long term remains in question. Many 
recipients face signifi cant barriers to 
employment, and those who get jobs 
commonly cycle in and out of work, earn 
low wages, and often continue to rely on 
government supports. 
In this article we present fi ndings 
from Welfare and Work: Experiences 
in Six Cities, in which we examined 
welfare participation and labor market 
involvement of female welfare recipients 
during the 1990s. Our analysis relied 
on individual-level welfare data linked 
to state earnings records for the core 
counties in six major urban areas—
Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Fort 
Lauderdale, Houston, and Kansas City—
which together accounted for around 5 
percent of the nation’s welfare caseload 
in 1991.1 The selected sites provide 
considerable diversity, as they include 
cities from a very low-benefi t state 
(Texas) and a classic northern urban area 
(Chicago), two cities on the border of the 
old South (Baltimore and Kansas City), 
and a traditional southern city (Atlanta). 
Three of the cities have signifi cant 
representation of Hispanics. 
The cities chosen also allowed us to 
examine the extent to which differences 
in state and local policy, administrative 
directives, and local labor market 
NOTE: This article highlights some of the research 
fi ndings that appear in the authors’ new book, 
Welfare and Work: Experiences in Six Cities, which 
is available from the Upjohn Institute (see p. 7).
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conditions contribute to observed 
trends. Policy and administrative 
changes designed to move families 
from the rolls have been facilitated by a 
growing economy, much more so than 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s during 
implementation of earlier reforms. Other 
supportive policy changes—including 
expansions of the federal Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC), Medicaid, and child 
care subsidies—were also occurring 
during this period.
Caseload declines vary among our 
sites but are substantial. They bracket 
the national decline, ranging from 44 
percent in Kansas City to 81 percent 
in Fort Lauderdale. Many of the legal 
and policy changes following from 
welfare reform focused on the activities 
of recipients, attempting to create both 
incentives and opportunities for them 
to obtain employment and exit welfare. 
Time limits pushed people from the rolls, 
and mandatory programs attempted to 
help recipients build job skills and obtain 
employment. Some elements of welfare 
reform were also designed to reduce entry 
onto welfare. Explicit diversion programs 
were adopted by many states, in some 
cases requiring potential recipients to 
engage in job search before applying 
for welfare. Our analyses show that at 
each of our sites, increases in the welfare 
exit rate alone would have produced 
important caseload declines, ranging 
from 30 to 64 percent. Yet declines in 
the numbers entering welfare contributed 
substantially as well, causing caseloads to 
fall by 20 to 71 percent.
Employment of Welfare Leavers
Employment of leavers is of 
particular concern because national 
and state welfare reforms placed 
increased emphasis on this route of 
exit from welfare. Those supporting 
welfare reforms argued that training 
and related provisions, in conjunction 
with work requirements, would move 
welfare families into the world of work, 
providing them with new opportunities 
for betterment. Critics warned that it was 
more likely that reforms would force 
those who were ill-prepared for work to 
seek aid from family, private charities, 
or less restrictive public programs, 
causing increased hardship and ultimately 
damaging the welfare of their children.
Table 1 provides employment rates 
for those exiting welfare in each of 
our sites. We see that rates increased 
substantially between 1994 and 1997 
but changed little between 1997 and 
1999. These results do not accord with 
the views of either the supporters or the 
critics of reform. Moderate increases in 
the employment rates for welfare leavers 
in the face of the extraordinary economic 
growth in the 1990s do not suggest 
unprecedented opportunity for those who 
left welfare. On the other hand, the fact 
that employment rates did not decline 
suggests that reforms were somewhat 
successful in achieving the act’s 
employment goals. A fuller understanding 
requires looking at the types of jobs 
welfare leavers obtained and the factors 
determining their employment success.
Looking at Recipients’ Jobs
A central goal of welfare reform 
is moving recipients into stable jobs. 
Welfare recipients tend to have unstable, 
short-term jobs, with few benefits and 
low wages. Although we are unable to 
determine benefits, wage records allow 
us to determine how long an employee 
receives earnings from a given employer. 
Table 2 provides information on the 
stability of jobs obtained by welfare 
recipients. Only about half of all jobs 
last beyond the quarter in which they 
start, and this proportion did not change 
appreciably between 1994–1995 and 
1998–1999.
Only 4–10 percent of jobs last eight 
quarters or more. In three of the five sites 
where we can make comparisons, we 
see that the number of such long-term 
jobs has declined. Although these results 
might suggest a decline in the quality of 
jobs welfare recipients obtain, we found 
that similar declines occurred for other 
workers in the same firms. And, even 
where job stability has declined, earnings 
have not. Overall, we conclude that the 
kinds of jobs welfare recipients obtain 
have not seriously deteriorated over the 
1990s.
While changes over time are modest at 
best, by any standard welfare recipients’ 
jobs are poor ones. Over the life of the 
job—up to two years for our data—
average cumulative earnings are only 
between $2,000 (for Atlanta) and $5,000 
(for Chicago).2 Few of these jobs lead to 
economic self-sufficiency for mothers 
with one or more dependents. Some 
individuals may obtain sufficient earnings 
to move off of welfare and support their 
families if they succeed in cobbling 
together multiple low-paying jobs into  
a semi-steady earnings stream. Others  
may stumble onto a good job only after 
many tries.
Table 1  Employment Rate for Welfare Leavers in Six Areas
Employment rate (%)
Area 1994 1997 1999
Atlanta 58.5 64.5 61.2
Baltimore 44.8 54.6 59.7
Chicago 48.6a 54.5 56.7
Fort Lauderdale 53.3 53.2 55.4
Houston 43.7 50.4 49.1
Kansas City 57.6 65.2 66.0
NOTE: All measures apply to federal fiscal year (October–September) unless indicated otherwise. 
Site measures are means for four quarters.
a Fiscal year 1996.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations
Overall, we conclude that the 
kinds of jobs welfare recipients 
obtain have not seriously 
deteriorated over the 1990s.
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Finding a Good Job
Although opportunities clearly are 
limited, recipients who obtain the best 
jobs have substantial advantages. In 
all of our areas, the standard deviation 
of total earnings on a job is at least 50 
percent greater than the mean, implying 
that some jobs provide reasonably 
good long-term earnings in these urban 
labor markets. In considering how a 
particular welfare recipient achieves 
stable employment, it is natural to ask 
how important individual characteristics 
are in determining job stability and 
earnings. If individual characteristics 
are of primary importance, there is 
little benefit in placing individuals with 
certain employers, since the only route 
to achieving economic self-sufficiency 
will be to augment their human capital. In 
contrast, if certain employers offer highly 
desirable jobs—jobs that provide high 
stability and earnings to any incumbent—
individuals lucky enough to land them 
will do relatively well over time. 
What factors determine differences in 
earnings and job stability across jobs? We 
find that demographic characteristics play 
a role, but their effects are quite modest. 
In contrast, the industry of the employer 
is of substantial importance. Furthermore, 
when we examine those firms that 
employ many welfare recipients, we find 
that employers differ from one another 
quite dramatically. Some employers 
appear to offer unstable employment 
and low wages to all their employees, 
whereas others offer relative stability and 
higher wages.
One may be concerned, however, 
that observed differences between 
employers are the result of unmeasured 
differences between individuals. If some 
employers hire particularly capable 
individuals, but the differences between 
individuals are not readily observable, 
we may mistakenly assume that they 
offer desirable jobs. If this were the case, 
there would be no benefit in placing less 
qualified workers with such employers, 
since they would be expected to face 
summary dismissal. Fortunately, we 
are able to examine the importance 
of unmeasured individual factors, 
since many welfare recipients obtain 
multiple jobs. As might be expected, 
our analysis confirms that unmeasured 
differences between individuals do play 
an important role. But we find that even 
after controlling for such person “fixed 
effects,” substantial differences between 
jobs remain.
An indication of the extent to which 
jobs differ can be seen by observing 
industry differences. Figure 1 reports the 
total expected earnings for jobs in five 
industries, controlling for unmeasured 
individual characteristics. Although there 
are differences across our sites, variation 
in expected earnings across industries is 
generally consistent. As expected, jobs in 
temporary help services firms provide the 
lowest expected total earnings, reflecting 
both shorter duration of employment and 
lower quarterly earnings. Retail trade 
provides somewhat greater job stability 
and higher earnings, as does restaurant 
work. Manufacturing jobs are appreciably 
better than jobs in these other industries, 
often with total earnings two or three 
times those for temporary help jobs.
Conclusions
The 1990s saw a dramatic shift 
in the character and focus of welfare 
Table 2  Stability of Jobs Held by Welfare Recipients in Six Areas
Probability that job lasts 
more than 1 quarter
Probability that job lasts 
more than 7 quarters
Variables 1994–95 1998–99 1994–95 1998–99
Atlanta 0.472 0.457 0.050 0.050
Baltimore 0.536 0.525 0.089 0.060
Chicago 0.539 0.561 0.100 0.097
Fort Lauderdale 0.517 0.519 0.075 0.068
Houston 0.533 0.527 0.073 n/a


























Atlanta Baltimore Chicago Fort Lauderdale Houston Kansas City
Figure 1  Predicted Total Earnings for Job in Selected Industries
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Despite the poor prospects 
offered by the average welfare 
recipient’s job, we find 
evidence that some jobs do 
offer greater opportunities.
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in the United States. The proportion 
of recipients working increased 
substantially, and employment also was 
more prevalent among those leaving 
welfare. However, the kinds of jobs 
obtained by welfare recipients did not 
change dramatically. Expected earnings 
and job stability remained low for most 
recipients of cash assistance, and few of 
the jobs recipients landed could assure 
economic self-sufficiency. 
Despite the poor prospects offered 
by the average welfare recipient’s job, 
we find evidence that some jobs do offer 
greater opportunities. Even recipients 
who have had a string of dead-end or 
short-lived jobs may ultimately be able 
to obtain a job providing a reasonable 
chance for economic self-sufficiency. 
Federal and state reforms of the 
1990s have not altered this dynamic 
significantly. The goal of reduced 
dependency has been attained in that 
fewer individuals now receive cash aid 
and more are working. But there is no 
evidence that reform has substantially 
improved the lives of recipients or former 
recipients. 
Congress continues to struggle with 
reauthorizing the Personal Responsibility 
Act, having passed a series of temporary 
extensions since the Act expired at the 
end of September 2002. Yet differences 
between the House and Senate over 
work and participation requirements, 
allowable activities, and other issues 
have been substantial enough to keep 
those bodies from succeeding in crafting 
new legislation. Our research supports 
the view that the reforms of the 1990s 
were successful in moving individuals 
off the welfare rolls and into jobs. But 
if the ultimate goal is economic self-
sufficiency and not simply reductions in 
“dependency,” revisions of the program 
will need to go far beyond the reforms 
currently envisioned.
Notes
1.  Our analysis uses data from the county 
containing the central city. For convenience, we 
refer to each area by the city name.
2.  This figure is the sum of earnings for as long 
as the job lasts, up to eight quarters, with earnings 
adjusted for inflation and reported in 1999 fourth-
quarter dollars.
David W. Emmons, Eva Madly, and Stephen A. Woodbury
Refundable Tax Credits 
for Health Insurance
Dissatisfaction with the level 
and growth of the share of the U.S. 
population without health insurance 
has spurred interest in alternatives to 
the existing system of financing health 
care, which is dominated by employer-
provided health insurance among the 
nonpoor and nonelderly. One approach 
to reform would be to adopt a refundable 
tax credit for health insurance under 
the federal personal income tax. Such a 
policy would grant a tax credit up to a 
prespecified maximum—for example, 
$1,000 for an individual or $2,000 for a 
family—on a tax return where the filer 
purchased a private, nonemployer health 
insurance policy. For filers whose tax 
bill was less than the amount paid for 
insurance, the difference between the tax 
bill and the credit would be paid to the 
filer—hence, the refundable nature of the 
tax credit. 
The refundable tax credit is attractive 
for at least two reasons. First, it would 
make the same tax-favored treatment 
of health insurance available to all 
individuals, regardless of whether 
they are employed and regardless of 
whether their employer provides a 
health insurance plan. As a result, it 
should increase the number of insured 
individuals and decrease uninsurance. 
Second, a tax credit would generate 
growth in the market for private 
nonemployer health insurance and 
increase the population of health care 
consumers that have an interest in 
the characteristics and cost of their 
coverage. These informed, cost-conscious 
consumers could put a brake on 
increasing health care costs. 
The extent to which a tax credit for  
health insurance would reduce the 
number of uninsured individuals has been 
controversial. Pauly, Song, and Herring 
(2001) and others have simulated a 
variety of different tax credit policies and 
have found that a “reasonably generous” 
credit could reduce the number of 
uninsured individuals on the order of 50 
percent. However, simulations by Gruber 
(2000a,b) suggest that a health insurance 
tax credit might reduce the number of 
uninsured by only about 10 percent. 
Here, we summarize a recent study 
replicating and extending Gruber’s 
simulations (Emmons, Madly, and 
Woodbury 2005). Our goal is to 
illuminate Gruber’s modeling of health 
insurance coverage under a tax credit and 
to examine the sensitivity of the results to 
changes in the model’s key parameters; 
that is, we want to understand what 
makes the simulation model tick. The 
findings from this exercise are most 
relevant to Gruber’s widely discussed 
findings and to the particular tax credit 
analyzed. The simulations should not be 
interpreted as being relevant to proposals 
that, for example, would cover different 
populations, would apply tax credits of a 
different amount, or would eliminate the 
exclusion of employer contributions for 
employees’ health insurance premiums 
from employees’ taxable income. 
Outline of the Simulation Model
The simulation model we use is 
essentially a set of rules for determining 
whether a given individual (or family) 
would take up a federal refundable tax 
credit of $1,000 (for a single individual) 
NOTE: This article summarizes David W. 
Emmons, Eva Madly, and Stephen A. Woodbury’s 
“Refundable Tax Credits for Health Insurance: 
The Sensitivity of Simulated Impacts to Assumed 
Behavior,” Upjohn Institute Working Paper  
05-119, 2005. See http://www.upjohninstitute.org/
publications/wp/05-119.pdf.
Clearly, these wide simulated 
ranges highlight the uncertainty 
inherent in modeling the effects 
of health insurance tax credits.
